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ARTICLE

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL DAMAGES
Mary E. Becker*
INTRODUCTION

The proper measure of damages in promissory estoppel cases is
a traditional subject of controversy.1 During the drafting of section
90 of the Restatement of Contracts,2 Professor Williston maintained
that once a promise was enforced because a promisee had reasonably
relied upon it, expectation damages should be awarded, as in other
contract actions.3 Although the original section seemed to reflect this
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Research support was provided by a F.
Leroy Hill Fellowship from the Institute for Humane Studies and by the Russell Baker Scholars Fund, the Bernard F. Sang Faculty Fund and the John M. Olin Fund of the University of
Chicago. I thank Albert Alschuler, Walter Blum, Gerhard Casper, Frank Easterbrook, Richard Epstein, Daniel Fischel, Richard Helmholtz, Geoffery Miller, Bernard Meltzer, and Richard Posner for helpful comments on an early version of this article. I especially thank Douglas
Baird, Geoffery Stone, and Cass Sunstein for reading multiple drafts.
1. Courts and commentators have generally taken three approaches to measuring damages in promissory estoppel cases: the reliance measure, the expectancy measure, and a flexible
or discretionary approach. For cases awarding reliance damages, see Goodman v. Dicker, 169
F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn.
1981); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis.
2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). For cases granting expectation damages, see Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981); Signal Hill Aviation Co. v. Stroppe, 96 Cal.
App. 3d 627, 158 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d
123 (1958). For courts recognizing a flexible approach, see Farm Crop Energy, Inc. v. Old
Nat'l Bank, 38 Wash. App. 50, 685 P.2d 1097 (1984) (awarding lost profits). See also infra
notes 5-11 and accompanying text (the approaches taken by commentators).
2. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932), which in pertinent part states:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise.
3. 4 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS App. 97-106 (1926).
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view, 4 other commentators disagreed, arguing that when a non-bargain promise is enforced because of the promisee's reliance, liability
should be limited to the promisee's reliance loss.'
Promissory estoppel was initially limited to donative, non-commercial, situations. 6 With the expansion of promissory estoppel to
commercial settings, some commentators argue that expectation
damages are, or should be, generally available in commercial cases. 7
Other commentators note that a flexibile approach to damage
awards has evolved in promissory estoppel cases." According to these
commentators, there are two sets of cases with different measures of
damages: expectation damages in commercial settings and reliance
damages in donative settings.9 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopts a discretionary approach: "[t]he remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires." 10 Nonetheless most com4. The first § 90 provided that the "promise" was "binding," presumably by its terms,
once reasonably and forseeably relied upon. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90
(1932); see Comment, Once More into the Breach: Promissory Estoppel and Traditional
Damage Doctrine, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 559, 562-63 (1970).
5. See IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 205 (1963); Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 490-91 (1950);
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L. J. 52, 63-65
(1936)[hereinafter Contract Damages: 1];Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 401-06 (1937)[hereinafter Contract Damages: 2]; Shattuck,
Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 MICH. L. REV. 908, 942-43 (1937); Note, An Inquiry
Into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1,22-23 (1932).
6. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941);
James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933). For a comprehensive
analysis of the case law, see I S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§
139, 140 (3d ed. 1936); Boyer, supra note 5, at 461-70; Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and
Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 344 (1969); Note, Promissory EstoppelMeasure Of Damages, 13 VAND. L. REV. 705, 706 (1960); Comment, supra note 4, at 561.
7. Farber & Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible
Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 902, 945 (1985); Note, Farm Crop Energy v. Old National
Bank: A Meaningful Test For Damages Under Promissory Estoppel?, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 277, 294 (1987); Note, supra note 6, at 709; Comment, supra note 4, at 561, 568.
8. J.CALAMARI & J.PERILLO. THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 6-12, at 291 (3d ed. 1987);
A. CORIN, supra note 5, § 205, at 249; Contract Damages: 2, supra note 5, at 401-06; Comment, supra note 4, at 564.
9. Contract Damages: 2, supra note 5, at 401-06; Metzger & Phillips, The Emergence
of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 545
(1983); Comment, supra note 4, at 560-65. For an analysis of damages in donative settings,
see Infra notes 29-51 and accompanying text. For an analysis of damages in commercial settings, see infra notes 51-82 and accompanying text.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979), Comment d provides that
"The same factors which bear on whether any relief should be granted also bear on the character and extent of the remedy." See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 8, §§ 6-12, at
273; Henderson, supra note 6, at 378-87.
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mentators continue to view reliance damages as appropriate in many
donative settings.11
Views on damages in promissory estoppel cases are linked to a
more basic issue: Is the basis of liability in promissory estoppel cases
contract or tort? Commentators who view promissory estoppel as
more tort than contract consider reliance the appropriate measure of

damages,1 2 though in many commercial settings expectation damages may be the best measure of full reliance loss.' 3 In contrast,
those commentators who view promissory estoppel as more contract
than tort view expectation damages as generally appropriate, at least
4
in commercial settings.'
This article attempts to describe and explain damages in promissory estoppel cases. In doing so, I rely on an earlier article, which
explained why liability is imposed in promissory estoppel cases. 15
That article suggested that in most promissory estoppel cases liability can be understood as contractual in the broad sense that the
promisor intended to be legally bound under an objective standard,
even though some traditional formal limit on contract liability-such
as consideration or the Statute of Frauds - would bar enforcement." There are a few promissory estoppel cases, however, in which
liability can be understood only on the basis of tort notions.1 In
11. Henderson, supra note 6, at 379; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 9, at 545; Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CI. L. REV. 1 (1979); Comment, supra note 4, at 563, 565,
568. But see I S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 140 (3d ed.
1936)(advocating expectation damages in donative settings); Posner, Gratuitous Promises in
Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 413 (1977)(advocating expectation in donative
settings).
12. See Contract Damages: 2, supra note 5, at 406-10; Posner, supra note 11, at 416.
13. See Contract Damages: 1, supra note 5, at 60 (observing that full reliance in a
commercial setting is often best measured by expectation damages). See also Metzger & Phillips, supra note 9, at 545 (noting that expectation damages may be best remedy for full reliance since lost profits from forgone opportunities are not always included in reliance); Comment, supra note 4, at 566-70 (noting that within the commercial setting, the goal of proper
compensation for gains prevented as well as opportunity costs may best be achieved by applying contract damage principles: expectation damages and mitigation rules).
14. See, e.g., Farber & Matheson, supra note 7, at 945; Metzger & Phillips, supra note
9, at 545; Note, supra note 6, at 709.
15. Barnett & Becker, PromissoryEstoppel, Contract Formalities,and Misrepresentation, 15 HOFSTRA L. RaV. 443 (1987).
16. Id. at 496.
17. Id. at 485-97. See Greenstein v. Flatley, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 351, 474 N.E.2d 1130
(1985) (awarding compensatory and punitive damages: the defendant engaged in a pattern of
conduct calculated to mislead plaintiffs into believing that a deal had been made). See also
Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958) (awarding expectation and reliance damages in similar situation).
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these cases, liability seems to be imposed because of misrepresenta-

tion, even though liability would not always lie under established tort
standards for misrepresentation.
In this article, I explain promissory estoppel damages in terms
of traditional contract and tort damage rules. I also consider whether
the use of promissory estoppel as a basis of liability, rather than
overtly changing traditional contract and tort limits on liability, has
affected the measure of relief.i s Section I analyzes the measure of
relief afforded in promissory estoppel cases in which the imposition
of liability can be understood as contractual in a very broad sense:
the promise was made with apparently an intent to be legally bound.
Although the absence of consideration or the informality of the
promise would normally bar recovery under traditional contract doctrines,' 9 in the vast majority of these cases, the relief awarded is
consistent with traditional contract remedy rules. In donative set° or specific performance 2l are often
tings,
widely-shared doubts
despite commentators'
by courtsdamages2
awardedexpectation

18. Recent articles have not discussed damages in promissory estoppel cases in any
depth. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 18-31 (discussing normative question of damages
in donative cases). Farber & Matheson, supra note 7, at 944 (only very brief discussion of
damages in article discribing liability extensively); Kostritsky, A New Theory of Asset-Based
Liability Emerging Under the Guise of PromissoryEstoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33
WAYNE L. REv. 895 (1987)(discussing only liability, not damages). Metzger & Phillips, supra
note 9, at 495-500, 544-45. A 1971 Comment is the most recent discussion of promissory
estoppel damages in any depth, and it discusses damages in only a narrow set of commercial
cases. See Comment, supra note 4, at 569-71, 582-603.
Although many commentators have assumed that tort damages would be limited to reliance losses, these commentators have not discussed in any depth how tort damage rules should
apply in promissory estoppel cases. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 18-31; Henderson
supra note 6, at 343-57; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 9, at 498-500; Posner, supra note 11,
at 416; Comment, supra note 4, at 559-65.
19. See infra notes 29-50 and accompanying text for an analysis of damages in donative
settings. For an analysis of damages in commercial settings, see infra notes 51-82 and accompanying text.
20. In re Estate of Bucci, 488 P.2d 216 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho
461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1969); In re Jamison's Estate, 202 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1947); Richetts v.
Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
21. See Horsfield v. Gedicks, 94 N.J. Eq. 82, 118 A. 275 (1922), affd sub nom. Roberts-Horfield v. Gedicks, 96 N.J. Eq. 384, 124 A. 925 (1924)(enforcing a promise to convey
land after the promisee took possession of the land and made substantial improvements). See
also Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898)(enforcing a promissory note which
grandfather had given grandaughter to induce her to abandon her lucrative position). When
specific performance is awarded in a donative setting, the courts tend to use the equitable
doctrine of part performance rather than promissory estoppel. See infra note 47; see also Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759 (1930); Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882);
Horsfield v. Gedicks, 94 N.J. Eq. 82, 118 A. 275 (1922), arid sub nom. Roberts-Horsfield v.
Gedicks, 96 N.J. Eq. 304, 124 A. 925 (1924); Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N.Y. 34 (1870).
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about such awards in these cases.22 Similarly, when promissory estoppel is used in commercial settings, the remedy is consistent with
traditional contract damage rules. Thus, courts routinely award expectation damages 23 unless those damages are too speculative, indefinite, or otherwise unavailable under traditional contract rules.24 The
many cases in which courts use both promissory estoppel and traditional contract analysis as alternative bases for reliefP5 are not discussed because there is nothing novel or interesting about damages
in such cases.
Section II analyzes the measure of damages in those promissory
estoppel cases in which courts impose liability on the basis of tort
notions: to remedy negligent or reckless promissory misrepresentations.26 In these cases, courts have tended to impose expectation
damages when expectation damages can be calculated. In addition,
punitive damages have been imposed in two cases in which the misrepresentation was intentional.2 Whether the overt use of tort principles to impose liability would have resulted in a different measure
of compensatory relief, limiting the plaintiff's compensation to reliance losses rather than expectation damages, is not clear.
I.
A.

DAMAGES IN CONTRACT CASES

Promises in Donative Settings

Most commentators agree that in donative settings, the case for
expectation damages is weak.2 9 In commercial settings a promisee
may rely on a gratuitous promise by foregoing alternative opportunities; expectation damages may be the best (or only) available proxy
22. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Bixler v. First Nat'l Bank, 49 Or. App. 195, 619 P.2d 895 (1980); Fretz
Constr. Co. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 626 S.W.2d 478, 483 (Tex. 1982); Contract Damages: 2,
supra note 5, at 379.
24. See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965) (holding loan arrangement
too vague and indefinite to be enforced under contract principles but using promissory estoppel
to impose reliance damages); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267
(1965)(compensating reliance on a promise when parties had not agreed upon specific terms of
exchange).
25. See, e.g., Litman v. Massachussetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1549, 1558-59

(11th Cir. 1984); Glover v. Sayer, 667 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Ala. 1983).
26. See infra notes 121-54 and accompanying text.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 121-30.
28. See Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958); Greenstein v.
Flatley, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 351, 474 N.E.2d 1130 (1985).
29. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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for actual reliance loss.30 When the promisor has promised to give a
gift to a donee, the donee rarely passes up equivalent opportunities to
receive equivalent gifts. The award of more than actual reliance loss
may compensate the donee for disappointed hopes, rather than any
actual loss.31
It is, therefore, surprising that courts have consistently and routinely awarded expectation damages when they enforce donative
promises, either on the basis of promissory estoppel,32 or by finding
(fictional) consideration. 3 When the question is whether to enforce a
formal promise to a charity, actual reliance is often not even required by many courts as a prerequisite to awarding full expectation
damages.34 In the context of family promises, reliance is generally
required as a prerequisite for liability.35 Yet once reliance has occurred, full expectation damages are awarded even when adequate
reliance damages can be easily calculated.3 6
In the context of formal promises to charities, any link between
reliance and enforcement either at the liability stage or the damage
stage makes little sense. Whether a charity will rely on a formal
subscription's legal enforceability depends entirely on whether the legal system enforces such promises. Charities are repeat players, and
will learn the legal rule. If charitable subscriptions are legally en30. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 9, at 545; Contract Damages: I, supra note 5, at
60. Fuller & Perdue first observed that full reliance in commercial settings is often best measured by expectation damages. Id. at 61.
31. Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 29-30. Eisenberg would generally award only reliance
damages in donative settings but would award expectation damages when adequate reliance
loss cannot be calculated. Other commentators suggest that expectation damages or specific
performance might be appropriate in some donative cases. See Contract Damages: 2, supra
note 5, at 405; Posner, supra note 11, at 413; Metger & Phillips, supra note 10, at 545.
32. See, e.g., Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 34 Del. Ch. 427, 104 A.2d 903 (1954);
Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759 (1930); Estate of Timko v. Oral Roberts Evangelistic Ass'n, 51 Mich. App. 662, 215 N.W.2d 750 (1974).
33. See, e.g., First Presbyterian Church v. Dennis, 178 Iowa 1352, 161 N.W. 183
(1917); Congressional B'nai Sholom v. Martin, 382 Mich. 659, 173 N.W.2d 504 (1969); In re
Upper Peninsula Dev. Bureau, 364 Mich. 179, 110 N.W.2d 709 (1961); Depaul Univ. v.
Ankeny, 97 Wash. 451, 166 P. 1148 (1917); 1. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N.Y.
427, 12 N.E.2d 532 (1938); Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246
N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927); E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.19 (1982); Barnett &
Becker, supra note 15, at 451-53.
34. See, e.g., In re Darian's Estate, 311 Ill. App. 481, 36 N.E.2d 608 (1941); In re
Stack's Estate, 164 Minn. 57, 204 N.W. 546 (1925); Salsbury y. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §90 comment f
(1979). See also Becker & Barnett, supra note 15, at 451-53.
35. See infra note 42 and accompanying text; see also Becker & Barnett, supra note 15,
at 453-55.
36. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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forced, charities will rely upon them as such. If charitable subscriptions are not legally enforced, charities will not rely on them. Formal
promises to charities should, therefore, either be enforced by their
terms, because giving donors the ability to bind themselves by their
promises to charities is desirable 37 - or should remain unenforced,
regardless of reliance. Most American jurisdictions, however, have
chosen to enforce charitable subscriptions despite the absence of
38
meaningful reliance.
In the context of family promises, linking reliance with liabilty
or damages makes more sense because these donees are less likely to
be repeat players. As a result, whether a particular family member
relies on a particular promised gift may have nothing to do with
whether the law would enforce such a promise. In In Re Estate of
Bucci,39 for example, a grandfather executed a formal "assignment"
of $17,000 to his granddaughter; he planned to give her the money
when certain real estate he owned was sold.40 The granddaughter
and grandfather had lived together for fifteen years. She had performed a variety of services for him and had helped care for him.
The grandfather wanted to buy a house for her, and they agreed on
a property with both a house and an apartment. The granddaughter
was to live in the house, and the grandfather and his wife in the
apartment. The granddaughter relied on his "assignment" by spending $2,000 to extend an option on the house.41 Shortly thereafter, the
grandfather died, and the question was whether the granddaughter
could enforce the promise against his estate. Although full reliance
damages could easily be calculated at $2,000, the court enforced the
grandfather's promise to give his granddaughter the full $17,000.
In cases like Bucci, reliance may occur regardless of the legal
rule on enforceability. Because the grandfather's promise was so formal -

an "assignment" -

the granddaughter may have assumed

that the promise would be legally enforceable. She would be less
likely than a charitable organization to know or learn the applicable
law, and more likely to rely on the formal "legal" document as enforceable. If the grandfather's promise had been less formal, the
37. See Posner, supra note 11, at 411-12.
38. See, e.g., In re Drain's Estate, 311 I11.App. 481, 36 N.E.2d 608 (1941); In re

Stack's Estate, 164 Minn. 57, 204 N.W. 546 (1925); Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
221 N.W.2d 609 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1979).
39.

488 P.2d 216 (Colo. App. 1971).

40.

Id. at 217.

41. Id. at 217-18. Originally, the grandfather had given the granddaughter $1,000 to
purchase the option. The $2,000 was paid to extend the option. Id.
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granddaughter might have relied on it without ever considering
whether the promise was legally enforceable. Again, her reliance
might be independent of the legal rules on enforceability.
Thus, reliance by a donee in a family setting does increase the
need for a remedy. In addition, reliance can be evidence that enforcement is appropriate. In Bucci, for example, the fact that the
grandfather invited and observed his granddaughter's reliance, with
no word of caution that reliance might be risky, is evidence that he
intended to be legally bound. Had his promise been less formal, her
reliance might have been crucial on this point.42
In the absence of reliance, a legal system might consider enforcement of such informal promises either inappropriate, because
there may be too little evidence that the promisor intended to be
legally bound, or not worth the costs of enforcement because there is
little need for a remedy. Once there is reliance, however, an award
of expectation damages is understandable for a number of reasons.
First, many of the family-gift cases are actions against the promisor's estate.43 In Bucci, for example, enforcement is appropriate not
only to redress the granddaughter's $2,000 reliance loss, but also because the grandfather actually wanted her to have his $17,000, and
he died before he could fulfill his promise.
Second, expectation damages are appropriate in Bucci because
the transaction was probably, at least in part, an implicit bargain.
The grandfather gave the granddaughter the note in exchange for
her (perhaps implicit) agreement to share the property with him and
his wife.44 To the extent that the promise was part of a bargain,45
42. When the promise is less formal, reliance invited or observed by the donor may be
crucial as evidence that the donor intended to be legally bound. See, e.g., Miller v. Lawlor, 245
Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954) (plaintiff bought land in reliance on defendant's promise
that he would not build on his own land in such a way as to obstruct plaintiff's view); Greiner
v. Greiner, 131 Kan. 760, 293 P. 759 (1930) (in reliance on mother's promise of house and
land, son gave up his own homestead, moved in with mother, and made improvements); Steele
v. Steele, 75 Md. 477, 23 A. 959 (1892) (son purchased woolen mill in reliance on father's oral
promise to give him $5000 of the purchase price); Horsfield v. Gedicks, 94 N.J. Eq. 82, 118 A.
275 (1922), aff'd sub nom. Roberts-Horsfield v. Gedicks, 96 N.J. Eq. 384, 124 A. 925 (1924)
(aunt and uncle promised neice to convey land, and neice made improvements); See also Barnett & Becker, supra note 15, at 453-55.
43. See, e.g., Burch v. Burch, 145 Colo. 125, 358 P.2d 1011 (1960); Choppin v.
Labranche, 48 La. Ann. 1217, 20 So. 681 (1896); Steele v. Steele, 75 Md. 477, 23 A. 959
(1892); In re Jamison's Estate, 202 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1947); Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51,
77 N.W. 365 (1898); Young v. Overbaugh, 145 N.Y. 158, 39 N.E. 712 (1895).
44. Bucci, 488 P.2d at 216. In Bucci, there may also have been an implicit understanding that the granddaughter would continue to care for the grandfather. See also Seavey v.
Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882) (father may have promised son land next to his own so that son

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL DAMAGES

19871

the grandfather would have wanted to bind himself, thereby increasing the chances that the granddaughter would fulfill her part of the
bargain in reliance on his promise. Once the granddaughter relied,
the bargain was no longer wholly executory, and the case for enforcement stronger.
In other cases involving donative settings, expectation damages
may be appropriate because reliance includes foregone opportunities
which cannot be recaptured or quantified. 6 Indeed, full reliance,
could it be quantified, would often be far greater than the value of
what was promised. These points are illustrated by many of the cases
in which the equitable doctrine of part performance is used to enforce (specifically) a promise to give land.47 The donee moves on to
the land, improves it, and lives his life differently because of the
promise. At the time of the promise, alternatives may have been
slightly more costly than the promised gift of land. However, after
years of reliance, the value of the promised land may be much less
than the promisee's reliance loss if the promise is not enforced. In
addition, it may be impossible to calculate full reliance damages (including foregone opportunities); enforcing the promise may be the
only way to protect reliance loss. 4 8 In some cases, both these reasons
would be near him); Horsfield v. Gedicks, 94 N.J. Eq. 82, 118 A. 275 (1922)(aunt promised

and provided house on aunt's land to her neice), affid sub nom. Roberts-Horsfield v. Gedicks,
96 N.J. Eq. 384, 124 A. 925 (1924); Wells v. Davis, 77 Tex. 636, 14 S.W. 231 (1890) ("do-

nor" lived with "donee" in house he had given her and performed many services for him while
he lived with her). For a discussion of the basis of liability in such cases, see Henderson,
Promises Groundedin the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contracts,57
VA. L. REv. 1115 (1971).,

45. Although lawyers commonly classify promises as either bargained-for or donative,
promises in donative settings may be part bargain and part gift.
46.

See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 26-28. Eisenberg argues that some informal

promises in donative settings should be fully enforced for this reason.
47.

Although my discussion is generally limited to cases in which promissory estoppel is

used to afford relief, I include cases decided under the equitable doctrine of part performance
because of the close relationship between this equitable doctrine and promissory estoppel.

"Part performance" is a form of reliance, and the cases decided under the equitable doctrine
were influential in the development of promissory estoppel. See EA. FARNSWORTH, supra note
33, § 2.19, at 89-92. See also Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267, 272
(1954)(paren needed).
48. See, e.g., Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882). For cases in which promissory estoppel or the equitable doctrine of part performance are used to enforce the promise, see
Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954) (before buying home on a hill, buyer

asks neighbor, a friend and the family doctor, whether he intends to stand by commitment not
to obstruct view); Choppin v. Labranche, 48 La. Ann. 1217, 20 So. 681 (1896) (owner of tomb
estopped from removing bodies after reliance on owner's legator's assurance that remains
would rest there forever); Horsfield v. Gedicks, 94 N.J. Eq. 82, 118 A. 275 (1922) (niece
moves on land promised her by aunt and uncle; with help of her husband and aunt, builds
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argue for full enforcement.4
Finally, there is the advantage of simplicity in the routine
award of expectation damages or specific performance when there
has been observed or expected reliance on a gratuitous promise in a
family situation. More finely tuned damage measures could be
imagined for some situations, but they might not be worth the costs
of case-by-case consideration of which damage rule to apply. 50 For
all of these reasons, the willingness of courts to use promissory estoppel and related doctrines to fully enforce promises in family settings,
once there has been reliance, is understandable.
Although promissory estoppel developed as a means of enforcing
promises in donative settings, it is most often used today to enforce
promises in commercial settings. I consider the award of damages in
commercial cases next, beginning with those cases in which promissory estoppel is used because of the absence of a clear bargain.
B. Not-Expressly-Bargained-ForPromises in Commercial
Settings
The imposition of liability in many promissory estoppel cases
can be explained by the fact that the promisor apparently intended
to be legally bound by the promise, though enforcement would at
house; after aunt's death, uncle retracts promise), affd sub nom. Roberts-Horsfield v. Gedicks,
96 N.J. Eq. 384, 124 A. 925 (1924).
49. See, e.g., Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882) (father died without deeding land to
son; son had lived on land promised him for twenty years and had built a house, a barn, a
stable, and other improvements; enforcement appropriate because father died without retracting promise, there was possibly an implicit bargain, and reliance cannot be recaptured or
quantified).
50. For example, consider the exceptions suggested by Eisenberg. As a general rule,
Eisenberg considers reliance the appropriate measure of recovery for breach of informal donative promises in the family context; "expectation [damages] should be employed as a surrogate
for measuring the costs of reliance only if those costs appear significant, difficult to quantify,
and closely related to the full extent of the promise." Id. Additionally, he notes that it "might
also be appropriate" to award expectation damages when the donee has become accustomed to
the promised gift and would sustain a loss in losing it. Id. at 29-30. For formal promises in the
family, Eisenberg concludes that the case for nonenforcement is (absent reliance) about as
strong as the case for enforcement. Id. at 18. Eisenberg notes, however, that special treatment
might be appropriate when the promisor has died without retracting a formal promise, but
concludes that in most such cases enforcement would be inappropriate either because the
promisor's failure to perform during life suggests that he had retracted it, or because the
promise was intended to take effect only at death, and enforcement is therefore inappropriate
because of rules governing wills. Id. at 18 n.57. It is not clear whether Eisenberg would allow
expectation damages to be awarded, at least after reliance has occured, against the donor's
estate when the formal promise could have been performed during life but was not, and the
delay does not suggest any change of heart.
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least be doubtful on the basis of traditional contract doctrines because of the absence of a clear bargain.5" In these cases, promissory
estoppel is routinely used as a basis for awarding full expectation
damages provided that expectation damages would be awarded were
a more conventional analysis used as the basis for recovery. Although these promises are not clearly bargained-for, expectation
damages are nevertheless appropriate for the reasons that expectation damages are appropriate when consideration is clearly bargained-for: to protect the promisee's restitution and reliance interests, and because judicial preferences may favor full enforcement.52
1. The Restitution Interest.-As Fuller and Perdue note, the
case for affording a remedy for breach of a promise is strongest
when the promisee has conferred a bargained-for benefit on the
promisor. 53 In these cases, the question is whether the promisor must
pay for a benefit conferred by the promisee in reliance on the promisor's promise. An award of the promised price is appropriate to prevent unjust enrichment of the promisor and to protect the promisee's
reliance.
Since promissory estoppel is usually regarded as a consideration
substitute, 54 this justification for expectation damages seems inapplicable. In fact, however, most of the cases in which promissory estoppel is used in commercial settings as the sole basis for liability 55 are
cases in which implicit (but real) bargains are enforced; in many of
these, the promisee has conferred the bargained-for benefit on the
56
promisor.
In United Electric Corp. v. All Service Electric, Inc.,57 for example, the court awarded expectation damages for breach of an implicit bargain when the promisor had received what he bargained
51. These cases are divided into five categories for purposes of that discussion: implicit
bargains, firm offers, waiver-like contract modifications, assurances likely to be regarded as
part of an overall bargain, and pension promised at or near retirement. See Barnett & Becker,
supra note 15, at 455-69.
52. Other commentators have also argued that expectation damages are appropriate in
commercial promissory estoppel cases to protect reliance. See Farber & Matheson, supra note
7, at 944; Comment, supra note 4, at 561, 568.
53. Contract Damages: 1, supra note 5, at 54-57.
54. See, e.g., Farber & Matheson, supra note 7, at 904; Comment, supra note 4, at 560.
55. As previously noted this article does not discuss cases in which promissory estoppel is
an alternative basis for relief.
56. When an implicit bargain is enforced though the promisee has not yet conferred a
benefit on the promisor, the case for full enforcement is slightly weaker. All the other reasons
for awarding expectation damages (other than as a form of restitution) apply. See infra notes
59-64 and accompanying text.
57. 256 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1977).
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for. 58 A general contractor promised a materialman that checks to
the subcontractor for electrical equipment would be jointly payable
to the subcontractor and the materialman. The general contractor
paid for electrical equipment with seven joint checks, but then issued
four checks solely to the shaky subcontractor. 11 As a result, United
Electric was not paid for some $8,000 worth of material.
The court used promissory estoppel to award expectation damages for breach of the implicit bargain.60 An award of expectation
damages protects reliance and serves as a remedy for unjust enrichment of the promisor. In reliance on the general's promise, the materialman transferred equipment worth $8,000 to the financially unstable subcontractor, and the materials were incorporated into a
building being built by the prime contractor, thus fulfilling the general contractor's obligation to install such materials under the prime
contract."'
This explanation of expectation damages holds only when the
promisee's performance of an implicit bargain enriches the promisor.
Why should expectation damages be awarded when a promise is not
clearly bargained for and the promisor has not benefited by the
promisee's performance?
2. The Reliance Interest.-Even when there is a clear bargain,
the promisee's lost expectancy is the weakest of contract claims.
Pure expectation damages represent only the promisee's disappointed
hopes, whereas reliance damages represent real losses.62 As Fuller
and Perdue point out in discussing bargain promises, there are nevertheless stronger reasons for awarding expectation damages than pro58. Id. at 96.
59. Id. at 94.
60. Id. at 95-96. The court used promissory estoppel, rather than bargain analysis, because the bargain was not express. Id. at 95. On its face, the general's promise to issue joint
checks was gratuitous, rather than made in exchange for United supplying electrical equipment to the financially unstable subcontractor.
61. For other examples of cases in which promissory estoppel is used to enforce partially
executed implicit bargains, and in which there is little difference between reliance, restitution,
and expectation damages, see Peterson Tractor Co. v. Orlando's Snack-Mobile Corp., 270 Cal.
App. 2d 787, 76 Cal. Rptr. 221 (1969); Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 428 P.2d
524 (1967); Fretz Constr. Co. v. Southern Nat'l Bank of Houston, 626 S.W.2d 478 (Tex.
1982). In some instances, reliance damages might not be very close to expectation damages,
but expectation damages may nevertheless be a good estimate of restitution damages and the
only available measure of relief. See, e.g., Mazer v. Jackson Ins. Agency, 340 So. 2d 770 (Ala.
1976) (enforcing, with order of specific performance, implicit bargain between developers, who
promised buffer zone between plaintiffs' homes and office park in exchange for plaintiff's ceasing to oppose annexation of office park to another town).
62. See Contract Damages: I, supra note 5, at 53-60.
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tecting disappointed hopes.63 Fuller and Perdue give two related reasons, and these reasons hold when there is a problem with the formal
requirement of a bargain. First, expectation damages are often equal
to, or a good substitute for, reliance loss. Second, expectation damages protect reliance by awarding damages irrespective of a showing
of reliance. Such protection is necessary because reliance is often difficult to show and to quantify. 4
Many of the cases in which promissory estoppel is used to enforce firm offers illustrate these points; often expectation damages
are either a good proxy for difficult-to-prove reliance loss or the only
way to protect reliance.65 In the typical "firm offer" case, promissory
estoppel is used to enforce a subcontractor's bid, after the general
contractor has relied by using it in preparing his bid on the prime
contract. The general contractor is typically awarded the difference
between the relied-upon bid and the price charged by another subcontractor to do the job.66
Actual reliance loss would be precisely this amount only if, absent reliance on the withdrawn bid, the general contractor would
have increased his bid on the prime contract to reflect the increased
price of the subcontract work and would have received the prime
contract at the higher bid. But the general contractor might not have
submitted a bid for precisely that amount or might not have received
the prime contract. If the general did not receive the prime contract,
he might have been able to bid on, and perform, another at a profit
similar to that he would have enjoyed for this project but for the
63. Id. at 60-64.
64. Id. at 60-62. Fuller and Perdue regarded these reasons as inapplicable to the proper
measure of damages for non-bargain promises under promissory estoppel. Id. at 64-65. In the
second part of their article, they argue for a flexible approach to damages in promissory estoppel cases. Contract Damages: 2, supra, note 5, at 405. They regard expectatation damages as
appropriate in some promissory estoppel cases because expectation damages are equivalent to

reliance damages or because "one would not be disposed to quarrel with this result in the
charitable subscription cases, or in those cases where by granting specific performance of the

promise all difficulties of evaluation can be avoided." Id. Fuller and Perdue wrote their classic
article at a very early date and prior to the expansion of promissory estoppel into a broad

range of commercial cases.
65. See, e.g., People's Nat'l Bank v. Linebarger Constr. Co., 219 Ark. 11, 240 S.W.2d
12 (1951); Homestead Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d 982, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 22 (1978); Peterson Tractor Co. v. Orlando's Snack-Mobile Corp., 270 Cal. App. 2d
787, 76 Cal. Rptr. 221 (1969); Farm Crop Energy, Inc. v. Old Nat'l Bank, 38 Wash. App. 50,
685 P.2d 1097 (1984).
66. See, e.g., Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Virginia Metal Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 930 (4th

Cir. 1983); Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1975); Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 376 Mass. 757, 384 N.E.2d 176 (1978).
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subcontractor's failure to stand by his bid.
Given these uncertainties, it would be difficult or impossible to
calculate the general's full reliance loss. But the difference between
the withdrawn bid and the cost of substitute performance by another
subcontractor may be a good substitute for full reliance loss. Perhaps
the general contractor would have received this contract at a price
close to his original bid plus the differential; if so, full reliance damages are close to expectation damages. Perhaps the general contractor would have lost this contract, but would have received and performed a similar prime contract for a profit close to the profit he
would have enjoyed on this one had the subcontractor stuck to its
bid. If so, awarding the general the differential is again a good estimate of full reliance loss. 6 7 Even if the differential is not a very good
proxy of the general's reliance loss, expectation damages are the only
effective way to protect the general contractor's reliance given the
difficulty of determining what would have happened and assigning a
monetary value to it. 68
3. Judicial Preferences.-In some cases, reliance damages are
probably minimal or nominal, yet expectation damages are routinely
given. Perhaps even in these cases, expectation damages may be
awarded to protect possible reliance, but other policy concerns appear to explain full enforcement. For example, in some of the cases
in which courts use promissory estoppel to enforce waiver-like contract modifications, reliance damages may be very low or nominal.
Yet the strong judicial hostility to forfeiture may argue for enforcement of the modification by its terms. In Brewer v. Universal Credit
Co.,69 the plaintiff purchased a car on credit, and the conditional
sales contract was assigned to the defendant credit company.70 When
the plaintiff defaulted on two payments, the credit company demanded possession, but later agreed that the car would be stored for
thirty days at the plaintiff's expense, and that the plaintiff would be
67. This analysis of the bidding cases was first presented in Comment, supra note 4, at
569-70.
68. For other cases illustrating these points, see the cases in which courts use promissory
estoppel to enforce non-bargain promises likely to be regarded as part of an overall bargain
transaction. See, e.g., Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 394 P.2d 571, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 731 (1964); Sanders v. United Distrib. Inc., 405 So. 2d 536 (La. Ct. App. 1981);
Hetchler v. American Life Ins. Co., 266 Mich. 608, 254 N.W. 221 (1934); Abelson v.
Genesco, 58 A.D.2d 774, 396 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1977); East Providence Credit Union v. Geremia,
103 R.I. 397, 239 A.2d 725 (1968); Green v. Helmcamp Ins. Agency, 499 S.W.2d 730 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973).
69. 191 Miss. 183, 192 So. 902 (1940).
70. Id. at 185, 192 So. at 902.
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able to pay the overdue installments during that period to recover his
car. 71 The plaintiff tendered the money due within the thirty days,
but the credit company had sold the car. It seems likely that the
plaintiff received full expectation damages on remand: compensation
for the costs of recovering "his" car after the resale.72
The plaintiffs reliance may have been quite minimal; there was
no evidence that he spent much time or effort finding funds to pay
the overdue payments. Nor was there any evidence that he would
have suffered any substantial loss had he repaid any additional loan
when the credit company withdrew its promise. Common law courts
are, however, hostile to forfeiture, 73 and nonenforcement of the
credit company's promise would result in forfeiture. An award of full
expectation damages is therefore understandable apart from the

74
need to protect the plaintiff's probably minimal reliance.
4. The Restitution Interest, the Reliance Interest, and Judicial
Preferences.- Expectation damages may be appropriate for all of
75 for examthe reasons discussed above. In Hessler Inc. v. Farrell,
ple, the court applied the notion of promissory estoppel to a retired
employee who had been promised $12,000 a year for five years as a
pension. 76 The promise was made to induce Farrell to retire voluntarily. After his retirement, his employer attempted to withdraw the
promise. 7 If one focuses on Farrell and his retirement, there is little
need for a promissory estoppel remedy. It is unlikely that Farrell

71.

Id. at 186, 192 So. at 902.

72.

The Mississippi Supreme Court did not precisely indicate what the plaintiff could

recover in the way of damages, but its remand suggests that the plaintiff was entitled to more
than just the expenses of reliance between the time the promise was made and the time the

promise was retracted. The plaintiff does not seem to have been asking for reliance losses, i.e.,
costs incurred in borrowing the overdue money and tendering it. Instead, as noted in the text,
he was seeking the costs of actually recovering his car after he learned that the credit com-

pany's promise had been withdrawn.
73. See e.g., Elizabeth Lodge No. 596, Loyal Order of Moose v. Ellis, 391 Pa. 19, 137
A.2d 286 (1958); Wallis v. Smith, 21 Ch. D. 243 (1882).

74. See, e.g., Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Basnight, 557 S.W.2d 597
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (enforcing insurer's promise to extend due date on premium, though
there was no reason to think that insured would have paid the premium before her death had
ther been no extension of time). In other cases in which promissory estoppel is used to enforce

waiver-like contract modifications, reliance may have been substantial, and expectation damages may be appropriate as a proxy for reliance or to protect reliance. See, e.g., Veasey v.

Layton, 42 Del. Ch. 55, 206 A.2d 505 (1964); Perry Publications, Inc. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 246 So. 2d 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.

Rubish, 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749 (1982).
75.

226 A.2d 708 (Del. 1967).

76. Id. at 710.
77. Id. at 710-11.
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relied very substantially or detrimentally by retiring. He was a terminable-at-will employee, and his employer wanted him to retire.
Had Farrell refused "voluntary retirement," he could (and might)
have been fired.
Enforcement with expectation damages is nevertheless understandable for the reasons identified above. First, there was a partially
performed implicit bargain. Whether or not Farrell's retirement was
very substantial or detrimental as reliance, it conferred an implicitly
bargained-for benefit on the promisor.78 As in other implicit bargain
cases, having enjoyed the benefits of the bargain, the promisor
should not be able to avoid paying the promised price.79
Second, although Farrell's retirement might not be very substantial as reliance, he may have relied in other ways which would
be difficult to prove or to quantify. For example, but for the promised pension, he might have looked for another job while he was still
employed. Once unemployed, substitute employment is more difficult
to find. Perhaps he would have made different financial arrangments
and plans for the future. Due to the difficulty of showing or quantifying such reliance, expectation damages are the only way to protect
it.
Third, it is likely that a judicial preference for legally enforceable pension rights helps explain the award of full expectation damages though Farrell may have suffered little loss by retiring voluntarily.8 0 Courts do not expressly mention such a preference, but such a
preference seems likely given the many legal rules favoring legally
enforceable pension rights. 81
C.

Other Formal Bars to Enforcement

Often, promissory estoppel is used to enforce a promise that is
clearly part of a bargain, but which would not be enforceable
under traditional rules because of some formal flaw, such as the
78. For a fuller discussion of the basis of liability in these cases, see Barnett & Becker,
supra note 15, at 467-69.
79. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
80. See also Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959)(enforcing
employer's promise to pay employee a monthly sum for life); Abelson v. Genesco, Inc., 58
A.D.2d 774, 396 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1977)(enforcing employer's promise to pay retirement
benefits).
81. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(a) (1986) (providing tax exempt status for certain legally
enforceable pension funds); In re Inland Steel Co., 21 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1310 (1948) (holding
that pension and retirement plans are part of the subject matter of mandatory bargaining for
union contracts).
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absence of a non-illusory and definite promise, or compliance
with the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule. 2 Because
similar reasons explain the full enforcement of all these promises,
this article discusses in depth only one of these groups: promises
barred by the Statute of Frauds. The case for limited enforcement is
stronger, in several respects, when enforcement is barred by the
Statute of Frauds, rather than by the parol evidence rule or by the
requirements that an enforceable promise be definite and not
illusory."3
The decision to afford a remedy for breach of a parol promise
under the Statute of Frauds depends, inter alia, on a court's assessment of the costs and benefits of this formal limit on contract liability. Traditionally, both common law courts and courts of equity have
afforded some remedies to protect reliance and to prevent unjust enrichment.8 4 Restitution is generally available when one party has
conferred goods or services on the other in accordance with a contract under the Statute. 5 In these cases, recovery has been limited to
the market value of the goods or services rather than the price orally
promised."8 In most jurisdictions, the equitable doctrine of part performance has afforded specific enforcement to promises under the
land provision of the Statute when the vendee has relied on the
promise.87 Most jurisdictions have adopted a similar exception to the
82. For a further discussion of the use of promissory estoppel as a basis for enforcement
when other formal defects bar enforcement, see Barnett & Becker, supra note 15, at 470-85.
83. First, the Statute of Frauds is a legislative decision, rather than a product of common law judgments. Second, most Statutes of Fraud draw clear, sharp lines and are therefore
more reliable as formal limits on liability (and hence more valuable as formalities) than are
the parol evidence rule and the requirements that a promise be definite and not illusory. See,
e.g., CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 1971 (Vest Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 725.01 (West
Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 59, 1 (Smith-Hurd 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-2-1-1
(West 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.32 (West 1950); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 259, §§ 15 (West 1976); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1987).
84. For sales of goods under the U.C.C., the Statute of Frauds is itself limited by the
need to provide a remedy for reliance and to prevent unjust enrichment. See U.C.C. § 2-201
(1978). Thus, for example, a seller who has manufactured goods for which there is no market
can enforce the parol contract when the circumstances "reasonably indicate that the goods are
for the buyer." U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a)(1978). The contract is enforceable to the extent goods
are "received and accepted" by the buyer. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c)(1978).
85. See, e.g., Blank v. Rodgers, 82 Cal. App. 35, 255 P. 235 (1927); Dale v. Fillenworth,
282 Minn. 7, 162 N.W.2d 234 (1968); Rick v. Sumler, 179 Va. 571, 19 S.E.2d 889 (1942).
86. See E. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 6.11, at 431-432. Often the promised price
is used as evidence of market value. See, e.g., Oxborough v. St. Martin, 169 Minn. 72, 210
N.W. 854 (1926); Bennett Leasing Co. v. Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246 (1963);
Cochran v. Bise, 197 Va. 483, 90 S.E.2d 178 (1955).
87. See Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 135 N.E. 273 (1922). There is some varia-
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one-year provision of the statute: when one party to a contract under
the one-year provision has fully performed her part of the bargain,
the bargain is enforced by its terms.88
There is a strong case for allowing at least a restitution remedy.
If no remedy were available, the Statute would be an invitation for
fraud; promisors could enjoy with impunity goods or services given in
return for parol promises under the Statute. On the other hand, the
Statute represents a legislative decision that certain promises should
be legally unenforceable unless in writing. Allowing only restitution
claims at the market rate rather than the contract rate seems a reasonable balance between the need to guard against the use of the
Statute to perpetrate fraud and the appropriate judicial deference to
the legislature.
A similar case can be made for the full performance exception
to the one-year provision of the Statute. When one party has fully
performed in the bargained-for way, a restitution remedy would usually be available.8 9 The only issue remaining is how to value the
goods or services conferred. When the party claiming the protection
of the Statute has allowed the other party to perform fully, the use
of the contract price simply eliminates the need to inquire into market price. In addition, the contract price will usually be a good substitute for the market price. Thus, the full performance exception to
the one-year provision can be regarded as a restitution remedy tailored to a particular factual setting.
In contrast, promissory estoppel and the equitable doctrine of
part performance afford a remedy when there has been reliance,
though the promisee may have conferred no bargained-for benefit on
the promisor. In these cases, one might expect damages to be limited
to reliance loss. If full expectation damages (or specific performance)
were available once there had been reliance, there would be little left
of the statutory bar. The promisor cannot plan her affairs in reliance
tion among jurisdictions as to what acts of reliance are sufficient for the equitable doctrine of
part prformance, but in most jurisdictions, a promise to transfer an interest in land is specifically enforced if the vendee has, for example, moved onto the land and made substantial improvements to it. See, e.g., Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882).
88. See, e.g., Trimmer v. Short, 492 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Coker v. Richter
Corp., 261 S.C. 402, 200 S.E.2d 231 (1973). In some jurisdictions, performance must take
place within a year in order to come within the exception to the Statute. See Emerson v.
Universal Prods. Co., 35 Del. 277, 162 A. 779 (Del. Super. Ct. 1932).
89. In some cases a restitution remedy might not be available. If the breaching party has
partially paid for the bargained-for benefit, restitution will afford a remedy only if the nonbreaching party can show that there is a difference between the partial payment and the market rate. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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on the Statute, i.e., cannot act with confidence that she will only be
subject to full contract liability for certain promises if they are in
writing.90 Instead, whether the promise is legally enforceable would
be at the option of the promisee: by relying, he can remove the
promise entirely from the operation of the Statute. Yet courts using
promissory estoppel and the equitable doctrine of part performance
to enforce parol promises under the Statute of Frauds routinely
award full expectation damages or even specific performance.91
There is some variation among jurisdictions with respect to judicial
willingness to afford these remedies. 2 When a court is willing to use
promissory estoppel or the equitable doctrine of part performance to
afford a remedy, however, the relief afforded is consistent with that
available in other contract actions. 93
For courts interested in affording a remedy beyond restitution,
all of the points made in the preceding section argue for full enforcement. When the contract has been partially performed, expectation
damages are appropriate. Restitution is too narrow a remedy to prevent all unjust enrichment.9 ' In addition, expectation damages are
often appropriate to protect reliance,95 or judicial preferences favor
90. Although even an award of reliance losses weakens the effectiveness of the Statute
as a formal limit on liablity, if only reliance damages were available, the promisor could at
least rely on not being held to such a promise by its terms unless she had signed a writing.
91. Monarco v. LoGraco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950); McIntosh v. Murphy,
52 Haw. 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970); Alpark Distrib., Inc. v. Poole, 95 Nev. 605, 600 P.2d 229
(1979).
92. See Barnett & Becker, supra note 15, at 470-75 (promissory estoppel); supra notes
87-88 (the equitable doctrine of part performance).
93. For cases in which promissory estoppel is used to award expectation damages, see
infra note 95. For examples of cases using the equitable doctrine of part performance to enforce specifically promises under the Statute, see, Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169
(1976); Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882).
94. In an action for compensation for benefits conferred under a contract covered by the
Statute of Frauds, restitution affords a remedy only if the goods or services are bargained-for
or when the promisor was obviously enriched by reliance. See EA. FARNSWORTH, supra note
33, § 6.11, at 430-33. Non-bargained for acts of reliance may benefit the promisor though
restitution would afford no remedy. Cf. Lacy v. Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 119, 105 P.2d 781
(1940) (using "estoppel" to avoid the Statute of Frauds in case in which restitution is inadequate). In addition, restitution may be unavailable when the receiver of goods or services partially pays as promised. In such cases, restitution affords a remedy only if the promisee can
establish that there is a difference between the partial payment and the market price. Cf.
Vastoler v. American Can Co., 700 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1983); Remilong v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461
(Wyo. 1978) (using "estoppel" to avoid Statute of Frauds when restitution inadequate because
of partial payment).
95. See, e.g., Lucas v. Whittaker Corp., 470 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1972) (awarding expectation damages when reliance losses were significant but not quantifiable); Monarco v.
LoGreco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950); Wilk v. Vencill, 30 Cal. 2d 621, 180 P.2d 351
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full enforcement."6 Similar reasons explain why expectation damages
are available when promissory estoppel is used to enforce indefinite
or illusory promises 97 or promises barred by the parol evidence
rule.98

Vastoler v. American Can Co. '9 illustrates all these points. In
order to induce Vastoler to accept a promotion to a supervisory position in 1963, his employer promised that he would receive full credit
for past service for all fringe-benefit purposes, including pension
rights. 100 Under the provisions of the pension plan, he was entitled
only to credit for post-1958 service. He was given full credit for all
other purposes (such as vacation time) until he retired in 1978, when
the company notified him that he would receive credit for only post1958 service for pension purposes. 101 The court never identified the

formal flaw, but it is likely that the plaintiff sued using promissory
estoppel, rather than breach of contract, 0 2 because of a percieved
problem (or problems) with the Statute of Frauds, the parol evidence
rule, or with the requirements that a promise be definite and non-

illusory.' 03
Regardless of the formal flaw, the court's award of expectation
(1947) (holding specific performance best way to protect reliance since alternative equivalent
transactions not available). For cases in which "estoppel" is used to avoid the Statute of
Frauds and in which expectation damages are probably equal to, or a good proxy for, reliance
loss, see Le Blond v. Wolfe, 83 Cal. App. 2d 282, 188 P.2d 278 (1948); Wolfe v. Wallingford
Bank & Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 1 A.2d 146 (1938); Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc., v.
Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1976).
96. For examples of cases in which courts did not discuss formal flaws, but in which
there may have been both a Statute of Frauds problem and a judicial preference for enforcement, see Vastoler v. American Can Co., 700 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1983); Van Hook v. Southern
Cal. Waiters Alliance, Local 17, 158 Cal. App. 2d 556, 323 P.2d 212 (1958).
97. See, e.g., Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 1986) (awarding
minimum expectation damages "simply on grounds of simplicity" for breach of an indefinite
contract). In some of the cases in which promissory estoppel is used to enforce illusory
promises, only reliance damages can be calculated because of the illusory nature of the promise. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. In other cases, full enforcement may be possible though the promise is somewhat illusory. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Ehret Co. v. Eaton, Yale, & Towne, Inc., 523 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976). There are, however, only a few cases in which promissory
estoppel is used to enforce promises barred by the parol evidence rule. See Barnett & Becker,
supra note 15, at 474-75; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 9, at 493-494.
99. 700 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1983).
100. Id. at 917.
101. Id. at 918.
102, The plaintiff did sue for breach of contract, but only for breach of the formal pension plan (whose language defeated his claim) rather than for breach of the 1963 agreement
reached prior to his accepting the supervisory position. Id. at 918.
103. See Barnett & Becker, supra note 15, at 481-85.
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damages is understandable for several reasons.104 First, there is the
problem of unjust enrichment. If Vastoler were given no relief, his
employer would be able to enjoy his services without paying the
promised price. Restitution would not remedy this unjust enrichment, since Vastoler would have to prove that he received less than
the market wages because of the pension promise."0 5 Such a showing
would almost certainly be impossible to make. In addition, expectation damages are appropriate to protect reliance, and the only available way to protect reliance; reliance damages could not possibly be
calculated. Finally, judicial preference for legally enforceable pension plans may explain full enforcement independent of the problems
of unjust enrichment and reliance. 0 6 Although the initial promise
might have been indefinite or illusory because the pension plan was
subject to change, these problems either no longer existed in 1978, or
could be made irrelevant by fashioning appropriate relief. There was
a plan in effect; the only question was how to calculate years of service. If the plan was subject to change, declaratory relief could be
given with respect to the future, and monetary relief limited to pastdue amounts.
D.

Limits on Expectation Damages in Commercial Cases

Although expectation damages are awarded in most promissory
estoppel cases enforcing promises in commercial settings, there are a
number of commercial cases where only reliance damages are
104. The court determined that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment, Vastoler, 700 F.2d at 917.
105. Whether Vastoler could take advantage of the full performance exception to the
one-year provision of the Statute is not clear. New Jersey appears to recognize the full performance exception to the one-year provision, but the decisions so noting involve contracts not
under the one-year provision at all. See, e.g., Dennis v. Thermoid Co., 19 N.J. Misc. 614, 22
A.2d 535 (Mercer County Ct. 1941), affd 128 N.J.L. 303, 25 A.2d 886 (1942) (holding that
Statute applies only if neither side can perform within one year). In addition, New Jersey
courts have been rather reluctant to find the Statute inapplicable in the employment context.
See, e.g., Deevy v. Porter, 11 N.J. 594, 95 A.2d 596 (1953) (holding that oral agreement of
employment for more than a year is within the Statute even though employees alleged that
under terms of agreement they were free to terminate relationship at any time). Thus, plaintifrs lawyer in Vastoler may have used promissory estoppel because of uncertainty about
whether the New Jersey Statute of Frauds would bar a contract action. Cf. Advocat v. Nexus
Industries, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 328, 333 (D. Del. 1980) (applying Maryland or New York law
and refusing to enforce promised pension because of Statute of Frauds though plaintiff seems
to have performed fully; "an oral contract of employment cannot be taken out of the Statute of
Frauds by part performance").
106. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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given.' 07 Even when a promise is part of a traditionally enforceable
bargain, however, there are a number of rules limiting the availability of expectation damages. 08 These rules explain why only reliance
damages are awarded (or requested by the plaintiff) in these cases.
For example, speculative damages cannot be recovered as expectation damages' 0 9 and expectation damages are not normally available
for breach of a promise to loan money. 10
Occasionally a court states that promissory estoppel damages
are always limited to reliance losses, although in the case at bar, the
availability of expectation damages is not an issue. 1" In other cases,
107. See Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Grouse v. Group Health
Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965);
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
108. In addition to the general limits on expectation damages discussed in the text, the
appropriate measure of damages may depend on the scope of a statutory obligation. See
Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. City of Inglewood-Los Angeles County Civic Center Auth., 40
Cal. App. 3d 98, 114 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1974). In Swinerton, the court limited the plaintiff to
reliance damages, though expectation damages would probably have been available under general damage rules for defendant's "breach" of a promise to accept the lowest responsible bidder. Liability depended, however, on the meaning of a statutory mandate that defendant accept the lowest responsible bidder. Id. at 104, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 838. In City of Inglewood-Los
Angeles City Civic Center Auth. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 861, 500 P.2d 601, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 689 (1972), the Supreme Court of California had held that the statute required more
than that the defendant-authority consider each bid and the bidder's responsibility in good
faith, though that obligation is all one can reasonably infer as a matter of contract from a
promise to take the lowest responsible bid.
109. See; e.g., Oxley v. Ralston Purina, Co., 349 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1965) (holding that
plaintiff can recover lost profits if reasonably certain after reliance on promise under Statute of
Frauds); Kaye v. Melzer, 87 Cal. App. 2d 299, 197 P.2d 50 (1948) (using promissory estoppel
to avoid the Statute of Frauds and awarding only reliance damages because, apparently, expectation damages would be speculative); Young v. Johnston, 475 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding that promissory estoppel limited plaintiff to reliance damages for breach
of promise to build home for a certain amount of money; difference between defendant's bid
and what another contractor would charge speculative as a measure of plaintiff's damage because plaintiff had not engaged another contractor to build home).
110. See, e.g., Bixler v. First National Bank, 49 Or. App. 195, 619 P.2d 895 (1980)
(holding that in promissory estoppel, plaintiff could only recover reliance damages for the defendant's breach of a firm commitment to loan money because of traditional limits on damages
in such situations). For breach of a promise to loan money, only reliance damages, costs of
searching for a substitute loan, and the interest-rate differential are available. See generally
E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 12.14-.18, at 878-99 (1982).
111. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 734 (Tex. 1982) (so stating
though court ruled for defendant; no "estoppel"); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97
(1965) (so stating though plaintiff only requested reliance losses; expectation damages would
be speculative and inappropriate because the promise was to loan money); Okemah Constr.
Inc. v. Barkley-Farmer, Inc., 583 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (so stating though court
holds for defendant; no promissory estoppel); E.F. Hutton & Co. Inc. v. Fox, 518 S.W.2d 849,
853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (so stating though court holds that there is no basis for imposing
any liability on defendant). See also Fretz Construction Co. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 626
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the same court will award expectation damages when expectation
damages would normally be available.1 1 2 In some cases, there is a
close link between the use of promissory estoppel and the inability to
calculate expectation damages under normal damage rules. When
promissory estoppel is used to afford a remedy for breach of an indefinite or illusory promise, it is sometimes impossible to calculate
expectation damages for the very reason that promissory estoppel is
used to afford relief: the promise is illusory or indefinite. 1
For example, several courts have used promissory estoppel to
award reliance damages for breach of a promise of employment
when the employer changes its mind prior to the scheduled starting
date. 11 4 Once employment started, it would have been terminable at
will.11 5 There is no way to determine how long, but for the preemployment breach, employment would have lasted; expectation damages are therefore speculative, and the courts' award of reliance
damages understandable under traditional damage rules. Out-ofpocket reliance damages can, of course, be calculated with relative
ease. 1 This result may seem strange and inconsistent with contract
S.W.2d 478, 483 (Tex. 1981) (so stating though no difference between reliance loss and expectation damages).
112. See, e.g., Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Basnight, 557 S.W.2d 597
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (awarding full expectation damages by using waiver and promissory
estoppel to enforce promise to extend time for paying insurance premium); Green v. Helmcamp Ins. Agency, 499 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (using promissory estoppel to bind
insurance company to coverage period as represented to the insured, and awarding full expectation damages); Southwest Water Services, Inc. v. Cope, 531 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975) (enforcing promised water rates using promissory estoppel to avoid defendant's arguments that agreement unenforceable because too indefinite and because no mutuality of obligation); Retama Manor Nursing Centers, Inc. v. Cole, 582 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
(awarding expectation damages, including lost profits, with promissory estoppel an alternative
basis of liability).
113. As already suggested in text in the discussion of Vastoler v. American Can, 700
F.2d 916 (3rd Cir. 1983), see supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text, this is not always
true. In some situations involving the enforcement of illusory or indefinite promises, the promisee's expectancy may be the only available measure of relief. See supra notes 62-68 and
accompanying text.
114. See Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952, 953 (1975); Ravelo v. County of Hawaii, 66
Haw. 194, 658 P.2d 883, 887 (1983); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114,
116 (Minn. 1981). For a similar case in another factual setting, see Vigoda v. Denver Urban
Renewal Auth., 646 P.2d 900, 904-05 (Colo. 1982) (holding reliance damages appropriate
when expectation damages would have been speculative because promise illusory; defendant
promised to negotiate for 90 days and then broke off negotiations for reasons unrelated to
negotiations).
115. The liability imposed because of the employer's pre-employment change of heart
may nevertheless be consistent with the parties' understanding of the allocation of this risk.
See Barnett & Becker, supra note 15, at 478-81.
116. In Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) for example, the court
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notions: awarding reliance damages may overcompensate the nonbreaching party by giving her more than she would have enjoyed had
there been no breach. For instance, the employee may have lost
$3,000 in reliance on a promise of employment breached prior to the
starting date. Had the employer not changed its mind prior to the
starting date, the employee might have been fired within a month for
incompetence or because of staff cut backs, and damages might have
been much less than $3,000.
In analogous situations, however, common law courts routinely
award reliance damages unless the breaching party can make the
often impossible showing that the contract would have been unprofitable for the non-breaching party."1 The breaching party is unlikely
to be able to show that the contract would have been unprofitable for
the same reason that the non-breaching party.is limited to reliance
damages: expectation damages are speculative.""8 There is nothing
anomolous about awarding known reliance losses when expectation
damages cannot be calculated.
E.

Conclusion

In general, when promissory estoppel is used to enforce promises
in donative or commercial settings, expectation damages are available as in other contract actions. There are several reasons for awarding expectation damages in the commercial cases: to prevent unjust
enrichment, to protect reliance, and because of judicial preferences.
When plaintiffs are limited to reliance damages in commercial cases,
only reliance loss would be recoverable under ordinary contract
rules.111
In donative cases, expectation damages are also generally available, even when reliance damages could easily be calculated. 12 0
There are a number of reasons for awarding expectation damages for
breach of a promise apparently made with an intent to be legally
bound in a donative setting, especially once there has been reliance:
to protect reliance, to enforce a possible partially-executed bargain;
to fulfill the promisor's intent, and to aviod complex rules about the
awarded $700 "based on Hunter's monthly wages at the telephone company [her prior employer], namely $350 per month, and on the period of her unemployment." Id. at 954.
117. See, e.g., Dade County v. Palmer & Baker Eng'rs, 339 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1964);
L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949).
118. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 12.16, at 890.

119. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
120.

See supra notes 28-49 and accompanying text.
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appropriate measure of damages.
II.

DAMAGES FOR MISREPRESENTATION

There are only a few promissory estoppel cases whose results

(including the measure of damages) cannot be entirely understood as
based on contract principles.1 21 This section describes and explains
the awards of monetary damages in these cases and considers
than tort as the basis
whether the use of promissory estoppel rather 122
of liability has affected the measure of relief.
The courts award expectation damages when expectation damages would be available under normal contract rules. Thus, when the
misrepresentation was early in the negotiating process and expectation damages are therefore speculative, the courts award only reliance damages.1 2 In other cases in which the negligent or reckless
misrepresentation occurred later, expectation damages are
awarded. 124 In the cases in which the misrepresentation was inten-

tional, the measure of damages seems to include a punitive element.1 25 In one of these cases, the court expressly indicates that it is
awarding an amount equal to expectation damages as punitive
damages. 28
121. In an earlier article, I discussed or noted six cases in which promissory estoppel
might have been used to remedy a factual or promissory misrepresentation. See Barnett &
Becker, supra note 15, at 485-95. These cases fall into into three factual patterns. In one pair
of cases, there is a reckless or negligent misrepresentation so early in the negotiating process
that it it is unlikely that either party thought a legally-binding commitment had been made.
Id. at 487-89. For a discussion of these cases see infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. In
a second pair of cases, there is an intentional misrepresentation at a later point in the negotiating process, when the key terms of the transaction have been worked out: expectation damages
can be calculated. Id. at 489-91. For a discussion of these cases see infra notes 133-48 and
accompanying text. The third pair of cases is like the second (expectation damages can be
calculated), but the misrepresentation may have been reckless or negligent rather than intentional. Id. at 491 n.221. For a discussion of these cases see infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
122. In tort, recission would also be available and is often the remedy preferred by
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Sharkey v. Burlingame Co., 131 Or. 185, 282 P. 546 (1929); McLean v.
Southwestern Casualty Ins. Co., 61 Okla. 79, 159 P. 660 (1916).
123. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
124. See Greenstein v. Flately, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 351, 474 N.E.2d 1130 (1985);
Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958). In Goodman v. Dicker, 169
F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948), however, there was no difference between reliance and expectation
damages, see infra note 151 and accompanying text. In Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642
F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981), the court awarded expectation damages as a proxy for full reliance.
See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
126. See Greenstein v. Flately, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 351, 474 N.E.2d 1130 (1985);
Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958)(punitive damages implicit in the
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Whether these results are consistent with the results these
courts would reach using tort damage rules is impossible to say.
There is a great deal of uncertainty and confusion about the proper
measure of damages in tort for misrepresentation in these kinds of
cases.
The results in the cases in which the misrepresentation is early
in the negotiating process are clearly consistent with the measure of
27
damages in tort. In Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,1
for example, the

court awarded the plaintiff's actual losses sustained in reliance on
the defendant's agents' misrepresentations that $18,000 cash would
be enough money for the plaintiff to become a Red Owl franchisee.1 18 The defendants offered this assurance in order to induce
Hoffman to take a number of actions in preparation for becoming a
franchisee, such as selling the bakery he had been operating and
running a small grocery to gain experience in the grocery business.129
In a tort action for misrepresentation, a plaintiff can recover as special damages any actual losses, provided that she shows that the
losses were the natural and proximate result of the misrepresentation.130 Hoffman's reliance losses were the natural and proximate result of the misrepresentations. The defendant's agents made the representations to induce precisely these acts, and Hoffman would not
have taken these actions but for the misrepresentation.
In the cases in which deliberate misrepresentation occurred
later in the negotiating process, it is not clear whether expectation
damages would have been available in tort. In Greenstein v.
Flatley,"13 for example, the defendants led the plaintiffs to think that
they would lease office space in a building owned by a defendant
until shortly before the lease was to begin and the plaintiffs' current
lease in another office building expired.132 The court used promissory
33
estoppel to award expectation damages and punitive damages (of
recovery awarded); infra note 148.
127. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
128. Id. at 703, 133 N.W.2d at 277. See also Werner v. Xerox Corp., 732 F.2d 580 (7th
Cir. 1984)(holding similar to Hoffman).
129. Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d at 687, 133 N.W. 2d at 269.
130. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KE ON, THE LAw OF ToRTs, § 110, at 766-67
(1984).
131. 19 Mass. App. Ct. 351, 474 N.E.2d 1130 (1985).
132. Id. at 352, 474 N.E.2d at 1132. See also Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 15 Del. 264,
144 A.2d 123 (1958)(defendants led plaintiff to believe franchise would be granted if plaintiff
would buy out other stockholders and thereafter transfer 51% of stock to person named by
defendant).
133. It might have been possible to award expectation damages on the basis of contract
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an equal amount) because the owner's conduct "was an intentional
course of action, taken to maintain his options despite plaintiffs' predictable reliance on the existence of a deal."""4
Traditionally, two measures of general damages had been used
in tort for misrepresentation in the context of bargain transactions or
negotiations: 35 benefit-of-the-bargain and out-of-pocket damages.
Usually, the tort issue arises when there is misrepresentation of the
quality or nature of what is being traded. 3 In such cases, the benefit-of-the-bargain measure is equal to expectation damages, and is
the difference between the value as represented and the actual value
of the thing traded. The other general damage measure, out-ofpocket damages, is more like a reliance measure, and is defined as
the difference between the contract price and the actual value of the
37
1
thing traded.

principles, since the owner's agent had signed a letter offering to "amend" the lease (the plaintiffs had submitted a signed copy of the lease prepared by the defendants to the defendants).
The plaintiffs accepted the amendment. As the appellate court noted in discussing, without
reaching, the issue of apparent authority, this instrument "signed on behalf of The Flatley
Company, written on a letterhead of The Flatley Company and bearing the home office address, would present some difficulty for the defendant. The test for apparent authority is how
the person dealing with the agent reasonably interprets the agent's authority." Greenstein, 19
Mass. at 355, 474 N.E.2d at 1133. But contract principles cannot explain the court's award of
punitive damages in addition to expectation damages.
134. 19 Mass. App. at 358; 474 N.E.2d at 1134. The defendants' misrepresentations
were intentional, though the misrepresentations might not have been actionable in tort in
Massachusetts. At the time the promissory misrepresentations were made, the defendants had
not decided not to deliver occupancy to the plantiffs. Had no more attractive alternative
presented itself, the plaintiffs would have eventually received a signed lease and occupancy.
See McCusker v. Geiger, 195 Mass. 46, 80 N.E. 648 (1907) (holding promise actionable as
fraud only when made after an "affirmative" decision not to perform; mere absence of intent
to perform insufficient).
135. Most promissory estoppel commentators have assumed that only reliance damages
would be available in tort. See, e.g., Farber & Matheson, supra note 7, at 945; Metzger &
Phillips, supra note 9, at 544-545. But see Contract Damages: 2, supra note 5, at 406-10
(noting that despite this widely-held assumption, most jurisdictions award contract-like remedy
for fraud or misrepresentation in context of bargain transaction). Instead of monetary damages, the victim of misrepresentation can also seek recission, see, e.g., Collins v. Lindsay, 25
S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1930), and sometimes reformation, see, e.g., Layh v. Jonas, 96 Idaho 688,
535 P.2d 661 (1975).
136. The majority rule is benefit-of-the-bargain; the minority rule out-of-pocket losses.
See W. PROSSER & W. KEFroN, supra note 130, § 110, at 767-68. Many courts have wavered
between the two, rather than applying either consistently. Id. at 768. Often, there is no difference between the two measures. Whenever the contract price is equal to the fair market value
of the property as represented, the two measures are identical: the contract price (or the value
of the property as represented) less the actual value of the property. Cf. Pao Ch'en Lee v.
Gregoriou, 50 Cal. 2d 502, 326 P.2d 135 (1958) (using purchase price as evidence of value of
property as represented).
137. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 130, § 110, at 766-68.

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:131

Traditionally, jurisdictions have purported to apply one of these
two measures of general damages in misrepresentation cases (in the
absence, of course, of any claim of special damages).18 The modern
trend, however, is toward a flexible approach, awarding those damages appropriate on the facts of the particular case. Under the flexible approach, the plaintiff usually has her choice of seeking out-ofpocket damages or benefit-of-the-bargain damages, provided that the
latter can be proven with sufficient certainty." 9 When these general
measures do not apply - because there was no misrepresentation of
the quality of something traded - the plaintiff can recover special
damages by showing actual losses which are the natural and proximate result of the misrepresentation.' 4"
Neither of these measures of general damages would determine
the damages in Greenstein. The benefit-of-the-bargain formula measures the difference between the value that the property traded
would have had if it had been as represented and its actual value.
When there has been misrepresentation about whether the parties
have a reliable agreement, the benefit-of-the-bargain formula is not
equivalent to expectation damages; indeed, the formula cannot be
applied. The out-of-pocket measure is also inapplicable since it too
refers to the value of something traded. Traditionally, courts have
limited plaintiffs in such situations to actual losses. 1 '
Some recent decisions suggest that some modern courts might
use expectation damages as a proxy for actual loss when, as in
Greenstein, forgone opportunites are a significant component in the
plaintiff's reliance loss. 14 2 In Greenstein, when the plaintiffs learned
that they would not be getting space in the defendants' building,
they had only a few weeks in which to find substitute space prior to
the termination of their current lease. Because of the defendants'
138. See supra note 136.
139. The leading case is Selman v. Shirley, 161 Or. 582, 85 P.2d 384 (1938), affd, 161
Or. 582, 91 P.2d 312 (1938). See also Hinkle v. Rockville Motor Co., 262 Md. App. 502, 278
A.2d 42 (1941) (holding that under flexible approach, $800 proper measure of damages where

defect about which seller lied could be fixed for that amount). See generally W.

PROSSER

&

W. KEETON, supra note 130, § 110, at 768-69.
140. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 130, § 110, at 766-67.
141. See, e.g., Morrison v. Glickman, 119 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y Civ. Ct. 1936); Welch v.
Lawson, 32 Miss. 170 (1856); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 130, § 110, at 766-67
("When the defendant's fraudulent conduct does not involve the transfer of property, the

plaintiff necessarily proves his claim by proving special or consequential damages if he can do
so.").
142.

See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text. See also Crummer v. Zalk, 248

Cal. App. 2d 794, 57 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1967).
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misrepresentations, the plaintiffs were limited to the thin market for
almost immediate occupancy. Expectation damages - the difference
between the rent promised by the defendants and rent on substitute
space found at the last minute - are a good proxy for full reliance
loss. Courts adopting the flexible modern approach stress the need to
apply the most appropriate damage measure in light of the factual
situation and the inadequacy of other damage measures. 4 Courts in
these jurisdictions might, therefore, be likely to award expectation
damages in a situation like that in Greenstein as a proxy for full
reliance loss. 144 Courts in out-of-pocket or benefit-of-the-bargain jurisdictions, however, might also be willing to use expectation damages in these situations to measure actual losses. 145 Even the out-ofpocket measure of general damages (which cannot be applied in this
situation) compensates the plaintiff for forgone opportunities.1 46
It is, however, impossible to state with certainty what measure
143. See, e.g., Weitzel v. Jukich, 73 Idaho 301, 308, 251 P.2d 542, 546 (1953) (Porter,
J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)("The underlying principle is that the victim of
fraud is entitled to compensation for every wrong which is the natural and proximate result of
the fraud. The measure of damages which should be adopted under the facts of a case is the
one which will effect such result.").
144. Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. 722, 320 N.E.2d 919 (1974), affid, 368
Mass. 811, 331 N.E. 2d 813 (1975) (in flexible jurisdiction, court affirms award of specific
performance in tort); Rokowsky v. Gordon, 531 F. Supp. 435 (D. Mass 1982), affd, 705 F.2d
439, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983)(court would prefer actual losses, but uses expectation
damages because of difficulty of determining losses caused by forgone opportunities).
145. See, e.g., Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981) (using expectation damages as a proxy for reliance loss in promissory estoppel case); Stephenson v.
Capano Development Inc., 462 A.2d 1069 (Del. 1983)(awarding interest rate differential as
special damages for fraudulent offer of low interest rate on mortgage; stressing that the plaintiff might not have bought property but for defendant's fraudulent offer). But see Gray v. Don
Miller & Associates, Inc., 35 Cal. 3rd 498, 647 P.2d 253, 198 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1984) (limiting
plaintiff to actual out-of-pocket loss caused by misrepresentation as to whether there was a
deal with a third party in jurisdiction with statute prescribing out-of-pocket rule for misrepresentation in purchase, sale, or exchange of property); Newkirk v. United Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 165 Ga. App. 311, 299 S.E.2d 183 (1983) (allowing only actual reliance loss in out-ofpocket jurisdiction for fraud when neither general damage formula would apply); Kensington
Publishing Corp. v. Kable News Co., 100 A.D.2d 802, 474 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1984) (denying
plaintiff's claim based on lost opportunities in out-of-pocket jurisdiction); Traylor v. Gray, 547
S.W.2d 644, 656-58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (awarding less than either expectation damages or
reliance damages for fraud in case in which neither general damage formula would apply).
146. An out-of-pocket damage award is the difference between the price paid by the
plaintiff for what was traded (e.g., $10,000) and the market value of what was traded (e.g.,
$8,000). This compensates the plaintiff for forgone opportunites since, but for defendant's misrepresentation, the plaintiff could have purchased the goods elsewhere for $8,000. Benefit-ofthe-bargain damages do more than compensate the plaintiff for forgone alternative opportunities; they give him the promised benefit though no honest seller would have promised so much
for so little.
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of damages would be imposed in tort for intentionally misleading
conduct about whether there will be a bargain. In Greenstein (and
the other promissory estoppel case dealing with intententional misrepresentation 7), it is possible - but by no means certain - that
the relief afforded48is consistent with the relief that would have been
1
available in tort.
In cases in which misrepresentation is made negligently or recklessly at a late point in the negotiating process, courts have awarded
either expectation or reliance damages.14 Again, as in the inten147. Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958). In this case, the
defendant's agent told Quimby that he would be awarded a terminable-on-ninety-days-notice
franchise if he bought the stock of the recently-deceased franchisee's widow. Id. at 269-70, 144
A.2d at 128. The promise was a lie when made. The agent never intended to award Quimby
the franchise but did want to satisfy Chrysler's "moral obligation" to the widow. Id. at 278,
144 A.2d at 134. The court awarded both the lost profits for the ninety days and the cost of
the stock (net of the value realized by selling the assets of the dealership). Thus, the court
awarded both expectation damages and reliance damages, a double recovery since the profit
could not have been enjoyed without buying the stock. Given that the defendant's agent deliberately and intentionally misled the plaintiff, the double recovery might include a punitive
element. It is impossible to know whether this case would have come out differently had tort
rules been used because we do not know what amount the court considered compensatory.
(Indeed, we do not even know whether the court realized that it was doing more than compensating the plaintiff.) Delaware is, however, a benefit-of-the-bargain jurisdiction, see, e.g., Nye
Odorless Incinerator Corp. v. Felton, 35 Del. 236, 162 A. 504 (1931). In Chrysler, unlike
Greenstein, the benefit-of-the-bargain measure could be applied because Chrysler's agent's
misrepresentation affected the value of the stock Quimby purchased from the widow. See, e.g.,
Hartwell Corp. v. Bumb, 345 F.2d 453 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 891 (1965) (general
damages in the form of benefit-of-the-bargain awarded for misrepresentation by trustee in
bankruptcy to purchaser of a division of a bankrupt corporation).
148. See, e.g., Rokowsky v. Gordon, 531 F. Supp. 435, 439 (D. Mass. 1982), affid, 705
F.2d 439, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983) (awarding expectation damages as proxy for full
reliance loss); Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. 722, 320 N.E.2d 919 (1974), aff'd, 368
Mass. 811, 331 N.E.2d 813 (1975) (affirming award of specific performance in tort). Greenstein was decided in Massachusetts which is a "flexible" jurisdiction. See Rice v. Price, 340
Mass. 502, 164 N.E.2d 891 (1960).
149. See Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981); Goodman v.
Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948). In both cases, the award of expectation damages
might have been imposed on the basis of contract and agency principles, though the courts
based liability on "estoppel" and "promissory estoppel." See Barnett & Becker, supra note 15,
at 487. On the other hand, liability might have been appropriate only in tort, not in contract.
In Walters, contract liability would lie only if the agents with whom the plaintiff dealt had
apparent authority to bind the defendant with oral assurances prior to approval of plaintiff's
application by the Marathon home office. (The lower court decision can be read as imposing
liability on the basis of such (or quite similar) findings). See Barnett & Becker, supra note 15,
at 489 n.215. In contrast, in tort, a principal is liable for misrepresentations by an agent during negotiations if the agent is authorized to negotiate, the other party had no warning that the
representations were unauthorized, and the representations concerned matters that the principal should expect to arise during negotiations. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 258 (1958). Thus, it is possible that though contract liability would be inappropriate because
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tional misrepresentation cases discussed above, it is not clear
whether different measures of relief would have been available in
tort. For example, in two cases, agents of a franchisor told a
franchise applicant to go ahead and spend money necessary to begin
the franchise operation because only formalities remained before he
would be officially given a franchise; final affirmative decisions had
already been made within the franchisor's organization. 150 The
agents were wrong, and the plaintiffs sued. In one of these cases, the
court's award of reliance losses was consistent with tort damage
rules, as compensation for actual losses, and with contract damage
rules, for breach of an indefinite-term contract.1 5' In the other case,
the court awarded expectation damages for the minimum franchise
period as a proxy for full reliance losses, including forgone opportunities.1 52 Whether the court would have been as willing to use expectation damages as a proxy for actual losses in tort is not clear for the
reason given in the preceding section: neither measure of general
damages applies in this situation, and there are too few modern cases
to know whether courts would award expectation damages as a
the agents lacked apparent authority to bind the principal by an oral assurance, the principal
might be liable in tort for misrepresentations made by the agents during negotiations. In
Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948), the defendants could be held liable on the
basis of contract and agency doctrines only if the defendants (the franchisor's local distributor)
led the plaintiffs reasonably to believe that the defendants were authorized agents of the
franchisor with power to enter into a contract on behalf of the franchisor, and the defendants
did agree to give them this franchise in the name of the franchisor. The defendants would then
be liable in contract for breach of the indefinite term contract because of their implied warranty of agency. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 329 comment g, j, illustration 8
(1958); See Barnett & Becker, supra note 15, at 488. But the defendants would be liable in
tort for negligent or reckless misrepresentation of fact (that the franchisor had made a decision), even though the plaintiffs did not think that the defendants were purporting to accept
their application in the name of the franchisor.
150. Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981); Goodman v. Dicker,
169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
151. In Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948) the franchise, if awarded,
would have been for an indefinite term. The franchise application stated: "Emerson Radio [the
franchisor] shall have the right to revoke the Franchise Certificate, if, at any time after the
issuance thereof, the dealer fails to comply with the above requirements." Joint Appendix at
10, Goodman. Modern courts have construed indefinite-term franchises as terminable only after a reasonable time when the franchisee invests in beginning operations. These courts have
construed "a reasonable time" as the time necessary to give the franchisee the opportunity to
recoup her investment. See, e.g., Whorral v. Drewry's Ltd. U.S.A., Inc., 214 F. Supp. 269, 271
(S.D. lo. 1963). There is, therefore, no difference between expectation damages and reliance
damages, and the Goodman court's award of $1150 in reliance losses was proper in tort as
compensation for actual losses. The court denied an additional recovery of expectation damages, but such a recovery would have been over-compensation in either contract or tort.
152. Walters v. Marathon Oil Company, 642 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981).
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proxy for actual losses when there has been no transfer of
property. 153
In addition, in these cases, the misrepresentations appear to
have been negligent rather than intentional."' Some courts have
awarded benefit-of-the-bargain damages only in cases in which the
misrepresentation is intentional, i.e., cases in which the defendant
knows that there is a discrepency between what he knows and what
he is telling the plaintiff.1 55 On the other hand, courts often impose
benefit-of-the-bargain damages without any discussion of this issue
or finding of intentional misrepresentation. 15 But some courts might
be unwilling to use expectation damages as a proxy for actual losses
unless the misrepresentation was intentional. As in the previous set
of cases, one cannot be sure whether the use of promissory estoppel
might affect the measure of relief.
As indicated at the beginning of this section, there are only a
handful of cases in which it seems likely that courts used promissory
estoppel to impose liability for misrepresentation rather than on the
basis of broad contract notions.1 57 In these cases, courts have
awarded expectation damages when expectation damages would be
available under ordinary contract damage rules. In addition, courts
have awarded punitive damages when the misrepresentation is deliberate and intentional.
When only reliance damages are available under normal contract rules, the use of promissory estoppel (rather than tort) has not
affected the measure of relief.158 When expectation damages are
awarded in promissory estoppel misrepresentation cases, the use of
promissory estoppel may affect the measure of relief. But there is
much uncertainty about the measure of damages in tort for misrepresentation in the context of an exchange transaction when there is
no transfer of property. When reliance includes passing up other opportunities, an award of expectation damages is consistent with the
153. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
154. There are no relevant factual findings, and based on the reported facts one could
argue either way. Walters v. Marathon Oil Company, 642 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981); Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
155. See, e.g., Danca v. Taunton Say. Bank, 385 Mass. 1, 429 N.E.2d 1129 (1982);

Anzalone v. Strand, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 45, 436 N.W.2d 960 (1982);
OF ToRTs §§ 526 comment d, 549, 552B (1976).

REsrATEMENT (SECOND)

156. Hessler Inc. v. Farrell, 226 A.2d 708 (Del. 1967); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51
Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958); Farm Crop Energy, Inc. v. Old Nat'l Bank, 38 Wash. App.
50, 658 P.2d 1097 (1984).
157. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
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general purpose of tort remedies: compensating the victim for her
actual losses.
III. CONCLUSION

In this article, I have described and explained the measure of
damages in promissory estoppel cases, building on a prior article in
which I described and explained the basis of liability in promissory
estoppel cases.1" 9 In most promissory estoppel cases, the measure of
damages, as well as the question of liability, can be understood on
the basis of traditional contract principles. Even in donative cases,
courts routinely afford full enforcement.16 0 In commercial contractbased cases, expectation damages are similarly available provided
that expectation damages would be available under normal limits on
expectation damages. 6
In the very few remaining cases, courts seem to use promissory
estoppel to afford a tort remedy for misrepresentation. In these
cases, courts award expectation damages when expectation damages
can be calculated. 62 When the misrepresentation occurs early during negotiations, there is only one possible remedy (reliance damages), under either tort or contract damage rules.163 When the misrepresentation occurs at a later point in negotiations and expectation
damages can be calculated, courts award expectation damages;""
such awards are neither clearly consistent nor clearly inconsistent
with tort damage rules. Consistent with tort damage rules, courts
awarding damages for intentional and deliberate misrepresentation
in promissory estoppel cases have included a punitive element. 6 5

159. See Barnett & Becker, supra note 15.
160. See supra notes 29-50 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 51-118 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.

